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Introduction
Aglobal China is made spatially possible by Chinese constructionworkers, comprised of more than 40 million peasant workers hailingfrom all parts of China’s countryside. Recent years have seen in-
creasing numbers of individual and collective actions among construction
workers pursuing delayed wages or demanding compensation for injury or
death. These actions include legal litigation, such as suing subcontractors
or companies, as well as collective actions such as property damage, phys-
ical assault, and even suicidal behaviour. Could these legal and collective
actions be understood as class actions, especially when framed by a dis-
course of human and legal rights? What is the relationship between legal
action (supposedly a realm of civil society) and collective resistance (sup-
posedly an area of class conflict driven by production relations)? In the
area of labour consciousness, how could workers make sense of their ac-
tions, both legal and/or collective, and negotiate with a hegemonic dis-
course? Do they transform legal action into class action at a particular
juncture and thereby transgress the construed hegemonic language of
legal rights? Addressing these questions requires an understanding of the
political economy of the construction industry that shapes the politics of
labour resistance among migrant construction workers. The first part of
this paper discusses changes in the political economy of the construction
industry and the rise of the labour subcontracting system that results in a
“double absence” – the absence of a boss and management and of a cap-
ital-labour relationship in the Reform period. The second part focuses on
how this “double absence” generates a variety of legal and collective ac-
tions among construction workers, and how the workers take and under-
stand their actions. 
The rapid development of the construction industry and accompanying
structural changes has led to the rebirth of a highly exploitative labour
subcontracting system that was abandoned during the socialist period. (1)
This labour system embodies two processes: the rapid commodification of
labour through non-industrial social relations organised by a quasi-labour
market in rural villages; and the subsumption of labour in the production
process of the construction sector in the urban areas. These two processes
have shaped a specific labour subcontracting system in China under re-
form, resulting in a perpetual process of wage arrears and the struggle of
construction workers to pursue delayed wages in various ways, usually in-
volving violent collective action. (2)
China’s construction industry has experienced astonishing growth in the
world market in recent years. (3) By 2007, the Chinese construction industry
was consuming half of the world’s concrete and a third of its steel for
building its global cities, and was employing more than 40 million workers,
most of them peasant-workers from all parts of the country. About 30 per-
cent of all migrant workers from the countryside work in the construction
industry. (4) In order to transform Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou into
China’s core global cities and speed up the process of urbanisation, China
has invested about $376 billion in construction each year since the Tenth
Five Year Plan (2001-2005), making construction the country’s fourth
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1. See Lei Guang’s study on the home renovation industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which is
one of a few but significant studies relating to construction workers. Lei Guang, “The Market as Social
Convention: Rural Migrants and the Making of China’s Home Renovation Market,” Critical Asian Stud-
ies, vol. 37, no. 3, 2005, pp. 391-411. See also Shen Yuan, Shichang, jieji yu shehui (Market, class and
society), Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007, pp. 216-269.
2. Pun Ngai and Lu Huilin, “A Culture of Violence: The Labor Subcontracting System and Collective Actions
by Construction Workers in Post-Socialist China,” The China Journal, no. 64, 2010, pp. 143-158.
3. In China, the construction industry is defined as the sector that creates buildings and other structures.
See Sun Sheng Han and George Ofori, “Construction industry in China’s regional economy, 1990-
1998,” Construction Management and Economics, vol. 19, 2001, pp. 189-205. 
4. See “Construction Workers Alienated,” China Daily, 9 July 2007.
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largest industry. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the construction
industry had become a strategic industry accounting for approximately 6.6
percent of China’s GDP. By the end of 2007, the industry’s total income
had risen by 25.9 percent to RMB 5.10 trillion, and total output value
reached RMB 2.27 trillion in the first half of 2008. (5)
This study draws on research conducted in seven cities – Beijing,
Shenyang, Chengdu, Guiyang, Wuhan, Changsha, and Guangzhou – in 2008
and 2009. More than 1,500 supervisors and workers were interviewed on
12 construction sites in these seven cities. In January 2009, the study fol-
lowed workers back home to a rural village in Tang County, Hebei Province,
where more than 1,500 working adults out of a population of 6,000 were
construction workers. In the village we further understand the social ori-
gins of the labour subcontracting system and how it served as the bedrock
for collective action among the migrant construction workers. 
It became clear to the research team that in contrast to the enormous
gross profits and output value of the construction industry, construction
workers remain a badly protected Chinese working class. (6) We were also
struck by the violent individual or collective action taken by workers. The
working lives of construction workers involved acts of individual and col-
lective conflict, attempts to damage buildings, physical assault, and even
suicidal behaviour. At the construction site we observed a variety of violent
actions that were no doubt engendered by changes in the history and po-
litical economy of the industry.
The labour subcontracting system
A socialist structure of the Chinese construction sector was radically
transformed during the Reform period. The Deng era reforms, accompa-
nied by a discourse of modernity, paradoxically brought an end to the “so-
cialist” and “modern” practices of the construction industry. The year 1980
marked the beginning of the end of the planned economy in industry, and
the resumption of the bidding and contract system in the construction in-
dustry. (7) A World Bank project, Lubuge Hydropower in Yunnan Province,
radically changed socialist practices in the construction sector through the
use of international competitive bidding in 1980. This represented the
launch of changes in the nature of capitalisation of the industry. As early
as 1978, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the construction industry could
be profitable. The reform objectives set for the construction industry in-
cluded restructuring the industry’s administrative system; opening con-
struction markets; granting autonomy to state-owned enterprises; estab-
lishing a competitive bidding system; and improving project managerial
skills. (8)
As the pioneer industry undertaking a series of reform programs, the con-
struction sector was the first to introduce “capitalistic” market mecha-
nisms into its operations. In 1984, the State Council promulgated a regu-
lation stating, “State-owned construction and installation enterprises shall
gradually reduce the number of fixed workers. In the future they shall not,
in principle, recruit any fixed workers except skilled operatives necessary to
keep the enterprise technically operational.” (9) Another significant 1984
regulation, the “Separation of Management from Field Operations,” stated
that general contractors or contracting companies should not directly em-
ploy their blue-collar workforce. (10) Rather, they should employ labour sub-
contractors who were to be responsible for recruiting the workforce. Need-
less to say, the regulations initiated an abrupt change in the capitalisation
as well as the management of the construction industry and the compo-
sition of its workforce, leading to problems in the labour subcontracting
system that became evident in the latter stage of reform. Driven by state
initiatives, construction enterprises were further marketised, and field op-
erations were alienated from direct management via the labour subcon-
tracting system. 
By the late 1990s, the restructuring of the capital-labour relationship in
the construction industry was almost complete. (11) While this series of dra-
matic changes arguably increased efficiency and productivity in the oper-
ation of construction projects, a direct result was the emergence of a
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5. See Zhongguo jianzhu nianjian, 2008 (Statistics of China’s Construction 2008), Guojia tongji chuban-
she.
6. “Badly protected working class” refers to work conditions such as intensity, hours, and payment meth-
ods, but not necessarily the pay rates of construction workers compared with workers in the manufac-
turing or service sectors. 
7. See also Lei Guang, op. cit., 2005, pp. 391-392.
8. See R.E. Mayo and G. Liu, “Reform Agenda of Chinese Industry,” Journal of Construction Engineering and
Management, vol. 121, no. 1, 1995, pp. 80-85. 
9. This was the “Tentative Provisions for Construction Industry and Capital Investment Administration
System Reform.” See Xin Zhongguo jianzhu ye wushi nian (Fifty years of New China’s construction in-
dustry), Beijing, Zhongguo sanxia chubanshe, 2000, pp. 7-8.
10. See the Construction Ministry’s report on Xin Zhongguo jianzhu ye wushi nian (Fifty years of New
China’s construction industry), ibid., p. 8.
11. In August 1995, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Power Industry, and the Ministry of
Transport jointly issued “The Circular on Granting Concession to Foreign Financed Capital Projects.” The
Construction Law was put into effect on 1 March 1998, covering a wide range of issues such as qual-
ifications for entry into the construction industry, procurement and delivery of work, construction su-
pervision, construction safety, construction quality, legal liability, market regulations, and procedures
in construction projects.
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multi-tiered labour subcontracting system. Today, irrespective of the loca-
tion of construction projects and the form of capitalisation, be it through
a state-owned or privately-owned company, the labour contracting sys-
tem is the most significant form of labour in the industry. Organised
through a subcontractor who recruits a team of peasant-workers from
rural areas to work on construction sites, more than 40 million workers are
now part of this labour subcontracting system. (12)
Looking deeply into the labour process of the industry, we see that a
double delinking of capital and industry and of management and produc-
tion created a power imbalance in the production chain more favourable
to the top-tier contractors. In the production chain, the top-tier contrac-
tors control construction projects through their relationship with property
developers and the local state while they at the same time outsource their
work to lower-tier subcontractors. In this hierarchical structure, the top-
tier contractors, without contributing substantial capital to the construc-
tion operation, seek to profit from the transfer of investment risk and
labour recruitment to their subcontractors. “They don’t bother to get their
hands dirty. They transfer all the risks to us. They make us face the workers
at times of wage arrears when the money doesn’t arrive from above,” said
Lao Fung, a third-tier subcontractor. This was the most frequent complaint
against top-tier contractors that we heard from labour-supply subcontrac-
tors at the construction sites. 
Let us take a typical construction project in Beijing or Guangzhou as an
example. The subcontracting system usually began with a giant property
developer responsible for land reclamation and the architecture and de-
sign of the villa project. This property developer can be state-owned or
privately owned enterprise. The actual construction was shifted down the
production chain through a bidding process to a construction company,
which is often a state-owned company that only took charge of project
management and
equipment arrange-
ments for its contrac-
tors. In the first tier of
subcontracting process
in the construction in-
dustry, it is highly mo-
nopolized by the state-
owned companies be-
cause of their strong
foothold in the indus-
try. This state-owned
company usually has a
numbers of contractors
coming from all over
the country. These con-
tractors are called
dabao (大包), big con-
tractors responsible for
providing raw materials
and labour for the proj-
ect. Sometimes these
contractors will set up a
labour service company
to help recruit rural
labourers, but in reality
they relied on labour-supply subcontractors (xiaobao 小包 or qingbao 清
包) to recruit labour, manage daily work assignments, and pay out wages
upon completion of the project. In return, these subcontractors further
depended on their labour-use facilitators, daigong (帶工), usually their
relatives or co-villagers, to recruit workers from their own or surrounding
villages. In this way, construction workers were organised into a number
of small subcontracting teams that worked on the construction site for
this project. The number of workers in each subcontracting team ranged
from a dozen to a hundred.  
The construction projects that we studied in the Beijing migrant commu-
nity brought very low profit margins for subcontractors, who often lacked
sufficient funds to tide them over until their final payment. The task was
to build 108 villas of 300-500 square meters. Lao Fung, an experienced
subcontractor, provided us with detailed information: to build a block of
villas with an estimated sale price of about RMB 10 million, the bidding
price was only RMB 760,000 (including the costs of raw materials, labour,
and administration) for the first-tier contractors, who out-sourced the
construction work to second-tier contractors, who further subcontracted
the work to labour-supply subcontractors. The standard unit price set for
labour costs was RMB 80,000, which meant that third-tier and fourth-tier
labour-supply subcontractors had only this lump sum from which to pay
the workers they recruited and to make a profit. Lao Fung explained, “We
almost lost money in building the villas. (13) Sometimes we run up debts
but still have to keep ourselves in the production chain, otherwise we’ll be
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12. The number of peasant-workers in the industry is listed in a 2004 ACFTU report, “A Survey on the Sit-
uation of Construction Peasant-Workers.” See http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20041111/
17381148918.shtml.
13. The structure of villas is more complicated than for a high-rise, requiring subcontractors to contribute
more labour days to completion of the work. 
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Table 1 – The Subcontracting System
Property Developer
Contractor                 Contractor                 Contractor
A team of workers           A team of workers           A team of workers           A team of workers
Labour-supplier 
Subcontractor
Labour-supplier 
Subcontractor
Labour-supplier 
Subcontractor
Construction Company
left out.” Coming from places such as Hebei, Anhui, Sichuan, and Shan-
dong, most contractors and subcontractors had little bargaining power
with the construction companies, which were mainly from big cities such
as Beijing and Guangzhou and were often transformed state enterprises
well connected with municipal administrations. Contractors and labour
subcontractors often faced serious arrears even in the modest payments
owed to them at the early stages of construction, and they were in a weak
position to stand up for themselves against locally influential developers
and construction companies. All these factors combined to make wage ar-
rears an intractable and unresolved problem. (14)
The subsumption of labour in the production
process
China’s rapid urban and industrial development and the further expan-
sion of the construction industry in the 1990s was accompanied by a
tremendous demand for cheap labour. The labour subcontracting system
subsequently stood out as the single greatest means of labour expropria-
tion, laying the foundation for the subsumption of labour in the production
process in its specific form. According to Marx, there are two forms of the
subsumption of labour under capital, i.e., the formal subsumption of labour
and the real subsumption of labour. (15) Today’s labour expropriation in the
construction industry can be considered a form of formal subsumption of
labour, under which the labour power of construction workers is subsumed
by the manipulation of capital through the labour subcontracting system.
In addition to the valorisation of surplus value for capital, it also creates
the following effects: further separation of means of production from con-
struction workers, prolonged reliance on subcontractors to recruit labour,
the absence of a direct capital-labour relationship, small-scale production
organised under small subcontracting teams, and last but not least, the
perpetual process of wage arrears. 
In China, the subsumption of labour in its specific form was not only a
product of industry restructuring, serving the process of capital accumula-
tion, but was also a joint creation of state and capital – because it was the
state that took the lead in changing ownership and management-labour
relations in the industry by ordering the construction industry to rely on
subcontracting, and by turning state-owned enterprises into profit-making
corporations. 
In the late 1990s, the development of the labour market working via the
labour subcontracting system left the rural workforce with no state or so-
cial protection. Workers had no health coverage, and no casualty insurance
or disability payments. By the end of the 1990s, subcontractors were re-
cruiting peasant-workers as casual labourers who were not even provided
with a legal contract as required by the Labour Law of 1995. (16) None of
the construction workers we’ve interviewed up to now has received regular
monthly payments, and not one has signed a labour contract. Although the
new Labour Contract Law came into force in January 2008, neither con-
tractors nor subcontractors observe the new law, and only a few workers
were aware of the new legal obligations binding contractors. Workers typ-
ically responded to our questions by saying, “What’s a labour contract?
No, we don’t have it. I’ve never heard of it.”
All of the workers we interviewed in Beijing, Shenyang, Chengdu,
Guiyang, Wuhan, Changsha, and Guangzhou from December 2007 to Jan-
uary 2009 had been promised a daily pay rate ranging from 50 yuan to
120 yuan, depending on the type of job and the skills required. (17)
Notwithstanding the promised pay rate, it will be observed that workers
run a significant risk of ultimately being paid at a substantially lower rate,
as well as a significant risk of never being paid at all, and without contracts
they have very limited recourse to the courts. This failure of the state to
provide legal and social protection to peasant-workers has reduced legal
reforms to little more than lip service. 
The growing incidence of non-payment of wages is a case in point. Since
developers do not pay contractors and sub-contractors until after the proj-
ect is completed, the workers are penalised by delayed payments – and as
will be seen, this puts them at great risk. Instead of weekly or monthly
wages, until the completion of the project or the end of the year construc-
tion workers are usually paid an irregular “living allowance” (生活費–
shenghuo fei) arranged by their labour-supply subcontractors, which is
barely enough to cover food and other daily expenses. The allowance
ranges from 100 to a few hundred yuan per month (about 10 to 20 per-
cent of their promised monthly income), depending on the quality of the
subcontractor. 
Many subcontractors had to use their own money to provide a living al-
lowance for their workers. Some workers received no living allowance at all
because their subcontractor claimed to have no money. The subsumption
of labour value in the production process was made possible when wages
were replaced by living allowances and when subcontractors justified this
practice by claiming a lack of funds for labour costs from their contractors. 
In the first day of 2008 Beijing was numbingly cold, and most of the
construction sites were already idle. In a shack on the outskirts of the me-
tropolis, Lao Chen, a 50-year-old Hubei worker was waiting anxiously to
receive his wages from the subcontractor. As we gathered round him in
the cold, Lao Chen opened his record of the past year’s work, showing
meticulously how he had worked 286 consecutive days with neither a day
off nor a penny to show for it. In his dorm at a construction site, he ex-
plained,
We’re not even workers. Workers sell their labour to the boss and in
return they receive wages…. But as construction workers, we’re dif-
ferent! I’ve been working 286 days for the boss and I still can’t get
my pay. I am waiting for my gongqian [工錢 – working money] (18)
just as I’m always waiting for my luck. 
12 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o  2 0 1 1 / 2
14. Pun Ngai and Lu Huilin, art. cit., pp. 149-150.
15. According to Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863, the form that produces absolute surplus
value is called the formal subsumption of labour under capital. It is distinguished only formally from
other modes of production in which the actual producers provide a surplus value, i.e., work more than
the necessary labour time, but for others rather than for themselves. The real subsumption of labour
under capital is developed in all forms that produce relative, as opposed to absolute, surplus value.
With the real subsumption of labour under capital, Marx argued, a complete revolution takes place in
the mode of production itself, in the productivity of labour, and in the relation – within production –
between the capitalist and the worker, as well as in the social relationship between them. 
16. The 1995 Labour Law was supposed to lay a foundation for workers’ legal and contractual rights, and
for a system for resolving labour disputes. In the 2000s, the Beijing leadership began to channel labour
disputes into arbitration committees and the court system through bureaucratic and legal procedures.
The Labour Contract Law, which went into effect on 1 January 2008, is considered the most significant
change in Chinese labour law in the Reform period. See http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-06/
29/content_669394.htm.
17. Women workers were paid 5 to 10 yuan less each day than their male counterparts on the same job.
Pay rates reached a peak in 2007 and 2008 due to the shortage of labour that became evident in the
early to mid-2000s. In 2006, the daily pay rates for cement pourers and carpenters were 30 yuan and
50 yuan respectively, and they soared to 50 yuan and 100 yuan in 2008.
18. In the construction industry, workers used the term gongqian (工錢 – work money) to describe their
wages. But in the manufacturing and service sectors, workers usually used gongzi (工資 – work pay-
ment), a more formal concept referring to wages. Gongzi means wage, and it bears a formal capital-
labour relationship, but the term gongqian does not have the same connotation. 
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Who is my boss? 
The rapidly changing social relations in rural areas further fuels problems
and conflicts derived from a labour subcontracting system that was sup-
posed to operate through kin and ethnic networks. The research team was
in a village in Tang County, Hebei Province, in the first week of January
2009. As in most Hebei villages, a major share of family income relied on
earnings from daigong, working outside the village, especially in the con-
struction industry. It was not a particularly poor village, with an average
annual family income of around RMB 15,000 to 20,000. We visited more
than 30 families that had one or more members working on construction
sites in Beijing. Having a long tradition in the construction industry, most
families had a father and son, that is, at least two generations, working in
the sector. These families were keen to show us their “papers of debt” that
they had collected over the years, each telling a story of unpaid toil. One
case of unpaid wages that we observed in the village was more than five
years old: a 45-year-old man, Hai, who had worked continuously in the
construction industry for ten years, showed us a piece of worn paper that
stated “XXX owes Hai 3,000 yuan only.” The debtor had signed it, making
the paper evidence of a debt owed to the worker. In this village, most
labour supply subcontractors recruited from their own or surrounding vil-
lages. 
Every time we encountered cases of debt, we enquired into the debt and
the reasons for non-payment. 
- “Do you mean the subcontractor intentionally kept your money,
or he couldn’t pay you because the money didn’t come through?”
we asked. 
- “Who knows? We didn’t know who the boss was. We haven’t even
seen the boss,” the worker usually would say. 
The boss the workers referred to was not the labour-supply subcontrac-
tor, but the second or third-layer contractor who out-sourced the work to
the labour-supply subcontractor. The subcontractor was the only target for
seeking wage payment because it was he who had recruited the workers,
even though he was not the boss in a legal sense. (19) At the beginning of
the Chinese New Year, the subcontractor would use his network in the vil-
lage to recruit a group of workers, the exact number depending on the size
of the construction project, and he would promise the workers a daily pay
rate. All of the workers knew that their wages would not be paid until the
completion of the construction project or the end of the year, a practice
that had already become routine in the village. As long as their wages were
received by the time they returned home to help with the harvest, or by
the end of the Chinese New Year, workers consented to this payment delay,
although not altogether willingly. In this sense, labour as a commodity
value is not reliant on legally required standards or accepted norms in so-
ciety at large. This commodification process was special in that non-indus-
trial social relationships were manipulated to serve the purpose of labour
expropriation while at the same time helping to disguise the wage-labour
relationship with capital. The “real” boss has become something of a myth
in China’s present construction industry. 
Construction workers’ trust that they would be paid regularly was based
on kin and co-villager networks. In the construction industry, workers were
led to believe that their subcontractor, as their relative or co-villager,
would not run away with the money. According to a saying popular among
the workers, especially the older generation, “A monk may run away but a
temple stays.” This means that the subcontractor still had a family in the
village, and it was difficult for the whole family to run away. This faith was
destroyed, however, when wage arrears and debt became routine in the
late 1990s. The rapid commodification of labour in the rural community
through labour-supply subcontractors has eroded trust. (20)
A number of workers emphasised their constant search for a new small
subcontractor that would be better than the previous one. The reason for
this practice was clear to us: no one was trusted enough in the village any-
more. But in times when jobs were badly needed, middle-aged workers in
particular had little choice of subcontractors. Even if the subcontractor had
a poor record of wage payment, there was still hope that he would be able
to pay at the end of the Lunar Year. 
We observed tense human relations in Hebei’s rural villages, with serious
worries and anxieties among workers that wages would not be paid and
that subcontractors, either relatives or co-villagers, would run off. Trust had
been destroyed, and normal human relationships were somewhat distorted.
As middle-men with personal networks who fed the construction industry
with cheap labour, subcontractors were the main agents in the process of
commodification of labour. Rural non-industrial social relationships were
manipulated to serve the purposes of labour subsumption, which in turn in-
tensified hidden social conflicts on the construction site and in the village. 
Legal action or class action? 
The political economy of the construction industry has shaped a specific
labour use system – a labour subcontracting system – that generates a
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19. Strictly speaking, according to the Company Law and the Construction Law, labour-supply subcontrac-
tors do not have corporate status and hence do not have a legal status to employ workers. 
20. This finding contradicts Shen Yuan’s study on construction workers, which argues that kinship and co-
village relationships among the workers were able to construct a relation-hegemony in which the
workers’ interests were disguised. See Shen Yuan, Shichang, jieji yu shehui (Market, class, and society),
Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007, pp. 216-269. 
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specific capital-labour relationship in which the legal labour identity and
labour relationship are highly subsumed. It creates a double absence in the
legal sense: an “absent” boss and an “absent” labour relationship. This dou-
ble absence has led to a perpetual process of wage arrears and the struggle
of construction workers to pursue delayed wages in various ways, usually
involving collective action. What is interesting to us is that even since the
issue of “double absence” has surfaced as a legal problem, few labour dis-
putes have actually reached the courts through formal legal procedures.
Instead, most labour disputes, following a series of labour actions, have
been settled through informal legal channels, especially through direct ne-
gotiations that often involve violent struggles with the construction com-
pany. 
Collective actions by construction workers have centred largely on wage
arrears and injury compensation. Under an unreasonable labour subcon-
tracting system, construction workers have gradually learnt that their
labour rights can hardly be protected. Unlike the studies by Lee (21) and Gal-
lagher, (22) which emphasised legalism regarding the labour rights of Chi-
nese migrant workers, our study found that few construction workers at-
tempted to take action through litigation or even labour arbitration. Most
workers launched direct individual or collective actions against construc-
tion companies or put pressure on local governments. The reason for this,
paradoxically, is also the “double absence” of the boss and the capital-
labour relationship in a legal sense. 
The workers usually did not take action until the bottom line of their
consent – receiving wages at the end of the Lunar Year – was broken. Once
action was taken, it was often of a violent nature, involving fighting, phys-
ical injury, suicidal behaviour, or attempts to damage buildings.
On a freezing winter’s evening in January 2008, we met Lan and her co-
workers in the workers’ dorm of a construction site in Beijing. Work had
ended a few days earlier, but workers’ wages had not arrived, leaving work-
ers waiting anxiously to return to their hometowns. Lan and her co-work-
ers, from a village in Hebei, were arguing with their subcontractor, who was
trying to convince the workers to wait patiently for their payments. The ar-
gument was so loud that it attracted workers from other dorms to gather
around. 
“You have to give us justice, (公道 – gongdao); working for no
money is simply against the law of heaven,” one worker said.
“We trusted you and we relied on you to chase up our money – our
money tainted with blood and sweat! Keeping our wage is against
the law (違法 – weifa) !” another worker followed. 
During the argument with the subcontractor, workers often used the
terms gongdao (the principle of justice) and weifa (against the law). 
The language the workers learned to claim their rights originated in the
central government’s discourse of legal labour rights. In order to alleviate
the industrial tensions engendered since the 1990s, the Chinese govern-
ment has issued a series of labour regulations and laws, not only to protect
labour rights but also to resolve social conflicts between capital and
labour. “Rule by law” has become not only a slogan of contemporary Chi-
nese society but also a means of political legitimacy for the Chinese party-
state. (23) It also represents a process of de-politicisation (de-ideologisa-
tion) of the party-state in its attempts to regain political hegemony
through a legal rationale. Hence an imagined “irrational” ideological soci-
ety in the socialist period is replaced by a “rational” legal society in the re-
form era, with “rule by law” used to defend an evolving constellation of
property rights and class relations. Faith in the law is a political device to
safeguard a changing political regime in the process of privatisation and
liberalisation that has led to a rapid transfer of wealth and a reconfigura-
tion of social class and status. Legalism has never been intended to support
a culture of civic participation, and even less to protect labour rights. The
workers had to learn this “truth” through their own actions. 
The concepts of justice and law have nevertheless embodied different
meanings when employed by workers. Using the term gongdao is a call for
morality derived from a basic belief in human fairness embedded in the
order of heaven and the cosmos. In the eyes of construction workers, gong-
dao is more basic and fundamental once it is challenged. Gongdao, with its
faith rooted at the community level, is therefore a habitus concept, (24) while
the concept of law, with its provisions by the state, is a formal legal concept.
We found that workers made stronger claims under gongdao than under
weifa, and that they were more angry when gongdao was transgressed. 
Law is a new faith in Chinese society created by the Chinese state. As a
new ideology, it occupies a key position in providing an understanding of
the normative behaviours of social agents, be they peasants, workers, or
bosses. However, if “building a legalised society” is a progressive attempt
in the eyes of the Chinese elite, it is less so to peasants and workers, who
understand their social lives through the principles of justice, humanity,
and morality. To request an explanation – “Tao yi ge shuo fa” (討一個說法)
– a usage often employed when construction workers go to the office of
the construction company demanding their delayed payments, is to ask for
moral grounds rather than a legal rationale. 
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Daily meal of a worker
© Pun Ngai and Xu Yi
Workers are usually very anxious to receive their wages before they re-
unite with their families for the Chinese New Year. 
As a mother of three children, Lan was less patient than the men in wait-
ing for her delayed payment. She had been away from home for half a year
working on the construction site, and her only reason for leaving her chil-
dren was to earn money for her family. Working for no money was simply
unacceptable. Taking action to demand their money was morally legiti-
mate, whether legal or illegal. She further complained,
A group of Henan workers took action to fight for their wages
yesterday. Why do we still have to wait? Wait for what? The
Henan workers threatened to damage the villas they built and
surrounded the office of the contractor on the construction site
and didn’t allow the office staff to leave. The staff then called the
police and two police cars came. The manager of the company fi-
nally showed up and promised to pay the workers three days
later….But how about us? We haven’t managed to nao [鬧– liter-
ally means to make noise and create a disturbance]! How can we
get our wages!
Arguments and fighting were a frequent phenomenon on the con-
struction site. Workers called for nao instead of legal means to resolve
their labour disputes. The tense relationship between subcontractors
and workers often triggered violent acts arising from verbal disagree-
ments. On several occasions we observed severe fighting, usually collec-
tive, between workers and their subcontractor, or between the subcon-
tractor and his workers against their contractor, or sometimes between
different subcontract teams over work conflicts on the construction
site. One case we observed was in December 2008, when a subcontrac-
tor called 20 of his workers to surround the office of his contractor to
demand a delayed payment. This ended up in collective fighting when
the contractor called in his own hired hands. Workers on both sides were
injured.
Lan’s group had been told by their subcontractor that they would
receive their wages on December 26. Some of her co-workers had
already bought train tickets, hoping to return home immediately
after receiving their three months’ payment. On December 29, the
subcontractor came and said the company still had not paid him
the money he needed to pay the workers. Since the New Year’s hol-
iday was imminent, the workers would have to wait until January 3.
When January 3 arrived, the workers still had not seen their money.
Anxiety and anger mounted. 
One of her co-workers, Tin, jumped into the conversation: 
We have to nao. We have to show our muscle. When we were work-
ing, they [the quality controllers sent by the contractor] came to
monitor and fuss over our job. Every day we were watched. But now
that our work is finished, we’ve been dumped. We are nobody. We
have to nao to demand our wages! 
Both in the city and in the village, nao, creating a disturbance, was the
word most frequently used when workers talked of demanding delayed
wages. Nao means action involving challenges to “face,” breaking up a re-
lationship, and disturbing social harmony by petitioning the manager’s of-
fice, labour bureau, and construction ministry and, if need, by blocking na-
tional highways to gain media attention. Most workers labouring in the in-
dustry for a few years found no way to resolve their wage arrears other
than nao, and nao therefore became a last resort, a weapon of the weak,
and an act of rightful resistance. (25)
The bargaining power of workers became minimal once their work was
completed and they were eager to return home. Staying on the construc-
tion site without work was like a punishment, and they still had to pay for
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Workers on struggle at construction site
© Pun Ngai and Xu Yi
Workers on strike
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their meals and other daily expenses. Waiting in the city hence meant a
double loss: on the one hand they could not return home in time to help
with the harvest, and on the other they were unable to earn money while
paying for daily living costs.
Lan’s co-workers insisted on taking action to back up their wage de-
mands. The workers feared simply waiting: “What do we do if January 6
comes and the boss still has no money to pay us? We can’t wait any
more.” The workers discussed the issue fiercely until they finally reached a
consensus to visit the offices of the Construction Ministry and ask officials
for help the next day. While some workers prepared a petition letter, others
collected information about their contractor and evidence of their labour
relationship with this contractor, while others tried to find the address of
the Ministry. Three workers, including Tin, were chosen as representatives
to meet with officials. It is common practice for the disadvantaged in need
of help to request a meeting with government officials. Even so, this was
recourse to official support beyond a sense of legal rationality. In the eyes
of the construction workers, the responsibility of officials to “resolve the
difficulties” (紓解民困) of ordinary people was what served as the grounds
of official legitimacy. 
The workers travelled three hours by bus to reach the Ministry building,
only to be told that they were at the wrong place; because they lacked a
labour contract, they had to go to the Labour Bureau for help. It took an-
other hour to reach the Labour Bureau, where staff directed them to the
District Labour Bureau in accordance with bureaucratic protocol; the work-
ers had to begin requesting assistance from the lowest level at their work
location. Late that afternoon, the workers finally reached the district office,
which was crowded with workers from other construction sites, all caught
in the same impasse of wage arrears. Tin observed:
Some workers were squatting quietly in the corridor waiting to see
the officials. Some, however, were very agitated, and shouted that if
they still couldn’t receive their wages, they would climb to the top
of the building and jump off. 
Workers from other groups applauded this suggestion and screamed
loudly that only a suicide attempt would make the boss listen to them and
repay them on the spot. “No boss has a conscience,” or, “All bosses have
the worst conscience” (黑心 – hei xin) were the most frequent utterances.
Self-destructive action or violent protest is often threatened when con-
struction workers see no way out. During the same month in 2009, at an-
other construction site we visited, a worker climbed onto a bulldozer in a
threat to commit suicide if his pay continued to be withheld. The construc-
tion company called the police, who arrived and ordered the worker to
climb down while also asking the company to pay his delayed wages. 
Other workers have been known to pick up axes and sledgehammers and
damage the villas they built. In June 2008, a group of construction workers
surrounded and wrecked a sales office as it prepared to welcome cus-
tomers one morning. The workers yelled, “The company cares about cus-
tomers, but not us!” This drew the attention of the property developer,
who put pressure on the construction company to resolve the wage ar-
rears. 
Blocking a major highway in order to attract the attention of top officials
in the central government was also a popular method of resistance. Only
by disrupting urban life were the city’s builders – these transient peasant-
workers – able to secure their wages. 
Tin and his co-workers were nevertheless still at the point of seeking re-
dress by appealing to the authorities. He and his co-workers waited for an
hour and a half to get in the door of the legal aid department of the District
Labour Bureau. The first question put to them was whether they had a
labour contract. They were told that if they did not, the Labour Department
could not help them, as they did not have a legal employer, and hence did
not have a legal labour relationship. Only if their labour relationship could
be legally proven could workers request help from the Labour Bureau. 
The staff of both the Construction Ministry and the District Labour Bu-
reau knew that most workers in this industry are not given labour con-
tracts. Tin asked, “If a labour contract is that important, why doesn’t the
government enforce it seriously? Why do none of us have contracts?” He
felt very angry after being shuttled from one department to another. A
hegemonic discourse on legalism was self-defeating, if not self-deceiving,
in the eyes of the agitated workers. The workers finally learned that they
were not protected by the law but excluded by it. As wage-labour, they
were not recognised as “workers” simply due to the lack of a legally re-
quired written labour contract. 
The failure to implement labour laws and disappointment toward the
local government drove workers to the brink of violent action. When three
of the workers returned to their construction site late that evening, they
were unable to calm down and repeatedly proclaimed to their co-workers
that if their money did not arrive, they had no choice but to fight: “It’s not
a normal industry! We workers have worked for no wage! ...If they don’t
give us our money, I’ll lay down my life to fight them. How dare they refuse
us our money?” But that evening Tin had not yet reached a point of push-
ing for actual violence. Instead, he began mobilising other workers to make
a protest banner reading, “Return my money tainted with my blood and
sweat!” (26) Such demonstrations were often one step away from physical
conflict.
These acts of labour conflict were not isolated cases we observed at con-
struction sites in Beijing and other cities. Rather, various efforts against
wage arrears culminated in violent acts when the issue of non-payment
became particularly severe at the end of the year. As a result, most of the
workers we interviewed participated in collective action of some kind. 
Conclusion
The struggle at the construction site – simply to fight for delayed wages
– can be understood as a “bottom-line” struggle, as it exposes the nature
of the subcontracting system and the failure of the politico-legal regime
to protect the basic labour rights of migrant workers. Construction workers
are well aware of the exploitative nature of the labour subcontracting sys-
tem, because it often results in wage arrears and lack of compensation for
bodily injury. During their struggles, the situation of “no boss” and hence
“no labour relationship” is not a legal issue to them but rather a class issue
disguised by legal discourse. 
It is crystal clear that while the workers seldom use the word “class,” they
replace it with the language of justice and law. In short, the principle of in-
justice (bu gongdao) refers to unfair treatment by others who violate the
minimum moral standards of society at large. A discourse of “rightful re-
sistance” seems to overshadow the discourse of “class action,” in that
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workers make sense of their suffering in terms of an embedded morality
rather than of class exploitation. 
On deeper examination, however, we find that accusations of injustice lie
at the very core of the capital-labour relationship, i.e., the production rela-
tion of the construction industry, which has been affected by rapid change
in the nature and structure of the industry during the reform period. The
political economy of “no boss” and “no labour relationship,” a delinking of
capital and industry and of management and labour, is also directly linked
with the specific and exploitative nature of the labour subcontracting sys-
tem. All labour struggles stem from this changing political economy of the
construction industry. 
It is not a “normal” industry for either subcontractors or workers, since
there is no boss, and no employer who is directly responsible for their em-
ployment. The capital-labour relationship has been entirely disguised: the
workers literally do not know the identity of the developers and construc-
tion companies who are ultimately responsible for the non-payment of
wages owed to them. This mis-recognition has been made possible
through a labour subcontracting system that sustains the valorisation of
capital without always recompensing subsumed labour: an invisible hand,
the market, operating several steps removed from the workforce, enables
the dealing out of a rigged losing hand to a transient army of labour. 
The specific practices involved in this rapidly changing construction in-
dustry induce angry, largely violent actions, sometimes a mixture of legal
and non-legal collective action by construction workers. Actions taken by
workers usually surface as a fight for legal labour rights, as the violation of
their basic rights is legally sanctioned. This does not mean, however, that
the minds of construction workers have been successfully indoctrinated
with the hegemonic discourse of “a legalised society” or legalism. Rather,
faith in legalism acts as a double-edged sword once workers discover that
the law is not on their side. It collapses. Furthermore, workers learn that
their basic labour rights are excluded rather than protected by law. 
In short, the labour subcontracting system is a core problem of the con-
struction industry, generating a series of collective actions acted out not in
legal but more in non-legal realms. When trust and faith in the law is lost,
delayed payment becomes unacceptable, and the workers’ consent breaks,
resulting in militant labour action.
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